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Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiff's Physician
and Defense Attorneys: Protecting the
Patient-Litigant's Right to A Fair Trial
Philip H. Corboy *
I.

INTRODUCTION

A long-departed TV game show took for its title one of life's
tough questions: "Who Do You Trust?" The physician whose
hands may hold the very thread of life surely is at the top of the
list. But the bonds of trust easily are broken. Too frequently, trust
falls victim to the pressures of adversarial litigation when the patient's injury or disease becomes the subject of a lawsuit.
The signs of betrayal may be subtle. The plaintiff's treating physician becomes less than cooperative during preparation of the
case. Calls are not returned; meetings declined. In deposition, the
doctor is reticent, while defense counsel asks few probing questions. Prior to trial, the plaintiff's attorney may find the doctor's
name on the defendant's list of proposed witnesses. In other cases,
the plaintiff calls the physician, and the damage is done in crossexamination. That damage could be a dramatic announcement
that the plaintiff's injury was not caused by defendant's alleged
negligence. Or it could take the form of a carefully contoured explanation of the medical records, drawing every inference in support of the defendant's theory and subtly undermining the
plaintiff's evidence. That the plaintiff's own doctor testifies adversely may itself doom the plaintiff's well-prepared case in the
eyes of the jury. It becomes painfully obvious that the doctor has
been meeting with the defendant's attorney. Understandably,
plaintiffs and the lawyers who represent them view this practice as
an outrageous betrayal of trust.'
Ex parte contacts 2 are a "hardball" tactic long favored by the
* Senior Partner, Corboy and Demetrio, Chicago, Illinois.
1. One plaintiff's lawyer likens this realization to the hurt amazement in Julius Caesar's exclamation, "Et tu, Brute," which he freely translates as "Why you dirty, twofaced son of a bitch!" Farage, Ex Parte Interrogation:Invasive Self-Help Discovery, 94
DICKINSON L. REV. 1, 10 (1989).
2. Ex parte is defined as "[o]n one side only; by or for one party .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979). The term is used in this article to refer to communica-
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defense bar, particularly in medical malpractice suits. A significant
number of courts have held that, in the absence of a rule or statute
to the contrary, courts may not prohibit ex parte discussions between the plaintiff's physician and defense counsel.3 Recent state
court decisions, including several overruling prior precedent, now
reflect a strong majority view that condemns ex parte conferences.
A clear turning point was a pair of decisions by the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Petrillo v. Syntex Labs. and Karsten v. McCray.5
Indeed, the reasoning set forth in these two opinions has shaped
the debate in nearly every subsequent case around the country.
Judicial analysis of ex parte interviews of plaintiff's physicians
has evolved from a fairly narrow focus on the statutory physicianpatient privilege, beginning with Petrillo-Karsten,and moving to
recognition of strong public policy interests in preserving the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship. At the heart of this
struggle is the role of confidentiality in the adversary system of
tions between plaintiff's physician and defense counsel outside the presence of plaintiff or
plaintiff's attorney and without plaintiff's consent.
3. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); Romine v. Medicenters of
America, 476 So. 2d 51 (Ala. 1985); Arctic Motor Freight v. Stover, 571 P.2d 1006
(Alaska 1977); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Coralluzzo
v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1984); Orr v. Sievert, 162 Ga. App. 677, 292 S.E.2d 548
(1982); Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem. Hosp., 769 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989); Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465 (1983); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 631, 558 A.2d
532 (1989); cf. Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985) (ex parte conferences permissible, but only upon notice to plaintiff and opportunity to seek protective
order to safeguard privileged matters).
4. Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1985); Weaver
v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D. 1981); Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 778
P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1989); Fields v. McNamara, 189 Colo. 284, 540 P.2d 327 (1975);
Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1986),
appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom Tobin v. Petrillo, 438 U.S. 1007
(1987); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986);
Schwartz v. Goldstein, 400 Mass. 152, 508 N.E.2d 97 (1987); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171
Mich. App. 328, 429 N.W.2d 891 (1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 912 (1989); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Missouri ex rel. Woytus v.
Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989); Jaap v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981);
Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743
P.2d 114 (1987); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1979), aff'd, 73
A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. Div. 1979), appeal dismissed, 432 N.Y.2d 364, 411
N.E.2d 783, 51 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1980); Johnson v. District Court, 738 P.2d 151 (Okla.
1987); Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1988); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d
675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988); Wisconsin ex rel. Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d 468, 373
N.W.2d 57 (1985).
5. 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d
361, cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509
N.E.2d 1376 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987).
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justice.6
Increasing insistence by defense attorneys on discussions with
doctors without the presence of the plaintiff or plaintiff's lawyer
will carry this debate to other courts. The public policy of safeguarding the confidential and fiduciary physician-patient relationship, as well as the countervailing arguments raised by the defense
bar, undoubtedly will be further refined. Courts also will be called
upon to define the scope of the rule against ex parte contacts and
fashion sanctions for its violation. Constitutional privacy considerations may yet be raised. This Article will examine these issues
with an emphasis on the practical realities of modern personal injury litigation. The implications reach to the fundamental fairness
in the manner in which our adversary system affords justice to injured victims. 7
II.

Two

PATHS TO THE TRUTH: CONFIDENTIALITY IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM

A. Ex Parte Contacts as an Evasion of the Safeguards
of Formal Discovery
Confidentiality and conflict - each represents a means of fostering the disclosure of the truth in matters of social importance. Our
society appears to hold them in equally high esteem. Confidentiality is essential to candid communication with one's attorney, confessor, or analyst. Candor, in turn, is essential to the social benefits
6. It is perhaps due to an erroneous view that the issue is one of "mere" trial practice
or discovery procedures that these developments have attracted scant attention in the
legal literature. The few articles on the subject have come from the pens of trial lawyers,
rather than academic commentators. See Farage, supra note 1; Hayes & Monahan, Do
Ex Parte Interviews Threaten Patient Privacy?, 17 THE BRIEF, 6 (Fall 1987); Quinn &
Smith, Physician-PatientPrivilege: Interviews Between Plaintiffs' Physicians and Defense
Attorneys, 66 CHI. BAR RECORD 146 (1984); McVisk, A More Balanced Approach to Ex
Parte Interviews by Treating Physicians, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 819 (1989); King & Hall,
Waiver of the Physician-PatientPrivilege in South Dakota - May Defense Counsel Conduct Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians?, 33 S.D.L. REV. 260 (1988);
Turner, Confidences of Malpractice Plaintiffs: Should Their Secrets Be Revealed?, 28 S.
TEX. L. REV. 71 (1987); Bower, UnauthorizedInterviews With the Plaintiff's Physicians:
"Anker" Revisited, 20 TRIAL LAW. Q. 30 (Summer 1989).
7. The importance of "personal injury law" to the social fabric that binds and defines
Americans should not be underestimated. Tort law vindicates individual rights, facilitates the workings of the market economy, resolves individual conflict, and preserves
social values. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS
A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW ch. 3 (1984) (Report to the American Bar

Association).

1004

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

of these relationships.' The relationship between patient and physician obviously depends upon confidentiality as a means of uncovering the truth. The American Medical Association has expressed
the profession's view:
Much of the information related by patients to their physicians is
highly personal. Patients have every right to expect that intimate
personal information communicated to physicians will remain
private... the assurance of confidentiality encourages patients to
be candid with their physicians and candor is essential to effective
diagnosis and medical management of the patient's ailments.9
The law, frequently life's mirror, has afforded a large measure of
protection to the trust between doctor and patient. Confidentiality
is guarded not only by the patient's evidentiary privilege,' 0 but also
by the confidentiality requirements of state medical licensing
laws," statutory safeguards surrounding medical records and patient information,' 2 and recognition by some states of tort liability
8. The law of privileges reflects this theorem, expressed in Dean Wigmore's classic
list of the elements for a valid evidentiary privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation
must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961 and Supp. 1989) (emphasis in
original).
9. Privacy of Medical Records Hearings on H.R. 2979 and H.R. 3444. Before Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1129 (1979). See also Hammonds v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("Since the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery, he cannot sift the circumstances of his life and habits to
determine what is information pertinent to his health. As a consequence, he must disclose all information in his consultations with his doctor - even that which is embarrassing, disgraceful, or incriminating. To promote full disclosure, the medical profession
extends the promise of secrecy ....
).
10. Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutory patient privileges. Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1532 (1985). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2380 (collecting and excerpting
statutes). The patient privilege in Illinois is set forth at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8802 (1987).
11. State laws have long provided that a physician's license "may be revoked for
'betrayal of a professional secret to the detriment of the patient.'" Note, Liability of a
Physicianfor Revealing Out of Court His Patient's Confidences, 34 HARV. L. REV. 312,
313 (1921). More recently, courts have viewed these enactments as expressions of the
strong public policy favoring confidentiality. See, e.g., Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn.
405, 411, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 n.3 (1976); Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d
389, 392 (Mo. 1989).
12. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd, 1989) (prohibiting disclosure of identity or results of HIV blood test). For a compilation of state laws
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for disclosure of patient confidences."1
In litigation, however, the path to truth is conflict. The adversary system of justice is based on an act of faith: that the truth is
best served when each side presents its best case, subject to probing
challenge by the opposing party, to a neutral tribunal. 4 It claims
right to every person's evidence and does not abide secrets gladly.' 5
Rules governing the adjudication of claims by injured victims
necessarily must accommodate these competing values. The
choice, however, is not between truth and secrecy. It is instead a
balance of interests that seeks to maximize disclosure of information when society needs to ascertain the truth. To allow plaintiffs
to demand compensation for personal injury, while denying the defense access to information regarding that injury, obviously subverts the truth-seeking function of litigation. It is equally clear,
however, that exacting too high a price from injured victims impedes frank disclosure within the physician-patient relationship.
protecting patient information, see

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF
HEALTH RECORDS, HEALTH RECORDS CONFIDENTIALITY LAW IN THE STATES (1979).

Important federal safeguards of the confidentiality of medical records are in the stringent non-disclosure provisions of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (1989), and the Drug
Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 290 ee-3 (1989). The federal and
state legislation and regulations enacted in the past 20 years has resulted in "unprecedented" protection of the confidentiality of health care information. Turkington, Legal
Protectionfor the Confidentiality of Health CareInformation in Pennsylvania:Patient and
Client Access; Testimonial Privileges; Damage Recovery for Unauthorized Extra-Legal
Disclosure, 32 VILL. L. REV. 259, 263 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); see generally Note, Breach
of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982); Annotation, Physician's Tort Liability, Apart From Defamation, For UnauthorizedDisclosure Of Confidential Information About Patient, 20 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968).
14. Hence Wigmore's exuberant tribute to cross-examination as "beyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 8, at § 1367. See also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note:
The rule assumes that the natural characteristics of the adversary system will
generally lead to an acceptable result, since the detailed account carries more
conviction than the broad assertion, and a lawyer can be expected to display his
witness to the best advantage. If he fails to do so, cross-examination and argument will point up the weakness.
See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415-17 (1952).
15. As explained by former Chief Justice Burger, "The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive .

. .

. The very

integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). As for evidentiary privileges, "these exceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id. at 710. Accord Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972).
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Moreover, a rule that deters victims from pursuing meritorious
claims also hides the truth from juries and undermines their role in
achieving the compensatory and deterrent goals of the substantive
law.
The balance struck by most legislatures has been to remove the
shield of privilege to the limited extent necessary to reach the truth
in litigation, while relying upon the adversary system itself to safeguard those limits. Virtually every state in which patient confidences are protected has adopted the "patient-litigant" exception.
A patient who has placed his or her physical condition at issue in a
lawsuit is deemed to have waived the privilege as to medical information relating to that condition. 1 6 The opposing party is entitled
to discover that information by deposition, interrogatory, and
other means provided by the rules of procedure, while other matters remain privileged.' 7 Formal discovery, of course, assures the
plaintiff's lawyer access to the information provided to the defendant and an opportunity to challenge improper lines of inquiry.
Thus, the adversarial process, which necessitates the limited exception to confidentiality, also ensures that discovery stays within its
proper limits. Indeed, the safeguards provided by formal discovery
are essential to the balance struck by the legislature. The argument
that the patient-litigant waiver gives defense counsel carte blanche
to discuss plaintiff's case with his or her physician:
ignores the protection afforded the confidentiality of information
told a physician by formal discovery methods. It is this protection, rather than the mere fact that a patient has filed suit, which
justifies the disclosure of otherwise confidential information told
a physician once a patient has filed a suit putting his mental or
physical condition at issue.' 8
The rules of procedure in most states, like the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, do not expressly provide that the enumerated
methods of discovery are the exclusive means of obtaining informa16. See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Ct., 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981);
Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969). The patient-litigant exception is incorporated in Illinois' privilege statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 8-802(4) (1987).
17. "A patient may waive this privilege by putting his or her physical condition in
issue. Waiver is not absolute, however, but is limited to medical information relevant to
the litigation." Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988)
(citation omitted). See also infra note 68 for further discussion of patient waiver.
18. Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 177 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 532
N.E.2d 327, 330 (1988) (citing Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., 148 Ill. App. 3d at 590-93, 499
N.E.2d at 952 (1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v.
Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987)).
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tion from plaintiff's treating physician.19 Defense attorneys have
seized upon this omission to make an end run around the protections built into the rules. In a typical scenario, defense counsel
receives notice of the personal injury suit against the client and
immediately obtains the plaintiff's medical records. The attorney
then calls or visits the plaintiff's doctors "to discuss the case." The
plaintiff's authorization for release of medical records often is sufficient to convince the doctor of the requisite patient consent.20
What transpires at these meetings is, of course, a large part of the
problem. The plaintiff's counsel rarely is notified and may learn of
the interviews only much later. It is virtually impossible to determine whether disclosure of privileged confidences or other improprieties occurred during the interviews.21 In essence, defense
counsel has been able to take advantage of the limited waiver of the
patient privilege while evading the adversarial safeguards embodied in formal discovery.
B.

The PracticalImpact of Ex ParteInterviews
on the Right to a Fair Trial

At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that the issues at stake
are not merely discovery matters. It must be recognized that ex
19. See Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128, (D.D.C. 1983) (the federal rules
"have never been thought to preclude the use of such venerable, if informal, discovery
techniques as the ex parte interview of a witness .... "). An exception is Louisiana's
privilege statute, which provides that disclosure may be made only through procedures
authorized by the rules. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3734(D) (West Supp. 1987).
On June 24, 1985, the Illinois legislature passed H.B. 1269 as an amendment to the
patient privilege, prohibiting disclosure except in accord with authorized methods of discovery under the rules. Governor Thompson amendatorily vetoed H.B. 1269 on Sept. 19,
1985.
20. Firestone, The Physician-Attorney as Co-Counsel, 20 TRIAL 76, 78 (May 1984).
Some plaintiffs have begun using specific language in medical authorization forms expressly denying consent to ex parte discussions with defense attorneys. Id. See also Turner, supra note 6, at 89 n. 109 (recommending that plaintiff's attorney direct a separate
letter to treating physicians asking that they not discuss the case with defense counsel).
Apparently, this does not always do the job. See Bower, supra note 6, at 31-31 (summarizing trial court sanctions imposed upon defense counsel who engaged in ex parte contacts despite an express prohibition); Brief for Plaintiff-Relator at 19-20, Missouri ex rel.
Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989) (defense attorney met secretly with plaintiff's physician despite express prohibition in medical authorization authored by defense
counsel; the plaintiff claimed that the defense attorney used a notice of deposition as a
"ruse" to obtain the ex parte meeting).
21. Indeed, courts have held that a plaintiff is not entitled to discover what occurred
at ex parte interviews on the grounds that the information is protected by the workproduct doctrine. Frantz v. Golebiewski, 407 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Moses v.
McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 631, 558
A.2d 532 (1989).
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parte contacts erode the fundamental right of injured victims to a
fair trial, in order to give the proper weight to the policy reasons
underlying the ban on such communications.
Virtually every issue in the controversy surrounding ex parte
contacts is present in Karsten v. McCray.2 2 A close examination of
Karsten is of particular interest to trial practitioners for an additional reason. Most appellate opinions address the issue in the discovery context, where parties have appealed a ruling on a defense
23
motion to compel the plaintiff to authorize ex parte interviews.
Personal injury lawyers know too well that the courtesy of notice is
not everyday practice. By the time the plaintiff's attorney usually
discovers or deduces that the conferences have occurred, he or she
is less likely to be discussing the fine points of discovery with the
court than to be frantically attempting to minimize the prejudice to
the client's case. In this respect, Karsten is more representative of
the problems confronting trial lawyers.
Moreover, the posture of the case colors the judicial assessment
of the policy issues at stake. An appeal from a pretrial order concerning "informal discovery" does not paint a full picture of the
prejudicial impact of ex parte contacts. Interestingly, the doctor in
Petrillo argued:
Although this Court is repeatedly told by plaintiffs that an ex
parte interview can become a "strategic or tactical advantage"
and that the interview may develop into "something else," this
Court is never informed by plaintiffs of the specific harms that
will result from the ex parte interview. 24
Karsten presented the appellate panel with a graphic demonstration that this issue is not a mere discovery matter, but an assault on
the fundamental right to a fair trial.
Joan Karsten, an active and otherwise healthy 45-year-old woman, visited an emergency room complaining of stomach pain. 25
Dr. McCray, a general surgeon, diagnosed acute appendicitis and
admitted her. The next day, he diagnosed a ruptured appendix.
Nevertheless, he did not perform an appendectomy until five hours
22. Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987).
23. E.g. Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Fields v. McNamara,
189 Colo. 284, 540 P.2d 327 (1975); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986);
Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389;
Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743
P.2d 114 (1987).
24. Contemnor's Reply Brief at 17, Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952.
25. 157 Ill. App. 3d at 4, 509 N.E.2d at 1377.
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later. He found an abscess and left the wound open for draining.
The wound was still open and draining ten days later, when Dr.
Asselmeier discharged Joan Karsten without an antibiotic.26 The
next week, Joan experienced jerking and slurred speech, and Dr.
Asselmeier reluctantly admitted her for tests. Dr. Menet, an internist, concluded that she had sepsis, an infection in the bloodstream.27 A few days later, Joan suffered a grand mal seizure and
lapsed into a coma that lasted for more than six weeks. She is left
with permanent quadriparesis, impaired speech and coordination,
and brain damage. In discharging Joan to a rehabilitative facility,
28
Dr. Menet recorded that her condition was due to sepsis.
The plaintiff brought suit against McCray and Asselmeier and
against Glen Ellyn Clinic, their employer, alleging negligent delay
in performing the appendectomy and negligence in treating the related infection. 29 At some point, the attorney representing both
McCray and the clinic met with Dr. Menet without the knowledge
of the plaintiff or her attorney.3 ° Defense counsel also learned that
in 1972, Joan Karsten had consulted with Dr. Dominguez, an orthopedic surgeon formerly associated with the clinic. She had
complained of weakness in her left arm, but Dr. Dominguez was
unable to diagnose any cause at that time." The defense pursued a
theory that Joan Karsten's injuries were not the result of the infection associated with her appendicitis, but were a manifestation of
some preexisting condition, perhaps multiple sclerosis or thrombotic thrombocytopenia purpura (T.T.P.), a rare blood disease,
which had come out of remission.32 After meeting with defendants' counsel, Dominguez and Menet agreed to testify in support of
the defense.
When the defense listed Dominguez and Menet as witnesses, the
plaintiff's attorney unsuccessfully moved to bar their testimony
based on the unauthorized ex parte discussions. The plaintiff also
moved in limine to bar any reference to a preexisting disorder.
Based on defense counsel's representation that an expert would testify that Joan Karsten did suffer from a disorder in 1972 that was
26. Id. at 5, 509 N.E.2d at 1377.
27. Id. at 5, 509 N.E.2d at 1378.
28. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 70, Karsten, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376
[hereinafter Brief for Joan Karsten]. Dr. Menet was the doctor primarily caring for Joan
during the second hospitalization. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 11, Karsten [hereinafter Brief for Dr. McCray].
29. 157 Ill. App. 3d at 6, 509 N.E.2d at 1378.
30. Id. at 7, 509 N.E.2d at 1379.
31. Id. at 8-9, 509 N.E.2d at 1381.
-32. Brief for Joan Karsten, supra note 28, at 37-38.
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causally related to her present injuries, the trial judge denied the
motions. 3a
With this green light, defendants' counsel embarked upon a
carefully planned scenario in which the physicians who treated
plaintiff were to play crucial roles. It is important to recognize the
obstacles facing defense counsel in constructing the preexisting
condition defense. The "condition" consisted of Joan's vague complaint of weakness in her left arm seven years before her appendectomy which her doctor could not diagnose, which apparently
resolved itself, and which bore no resemblance to her condition
following surgery. Against this was the absence of any diagnosis of
multiple sclerosis or TTP in the medical records; the testimony of
two highly qualified general surgeons that the defendants' care was
negligent and led to sepsis causing Joan's injuries; and Dr. Menet's
own diagnosis of sepsis.3 4
Defense counsel set the stage in his opening statement, emphasizing that, despite the entries in Joan's medical records, her doctors were unable to find the "real" cause of her condition. 35 As
early as 1972, he stated, her doctors "were concerned that she
might have multiple sclerosis. "36 He announced that the most
likely cause, as the evidence would show, was a rare but tragic
blood disease, TTP, which the defendants could not have uncovered, even using due care.37 It was up to the plaintiff's doctors to
build upon this theory while avoiding direct contradiction of their
earlier statements that would damage their credibility. For example, McCray testified that he considered the possibility of MS as a
cause. 38 Dominguez testified that Joan Karsten "looked like a person who might have MS." ' 39 The court found "numerous" other

references wafted into the jury box during the presentation of evidence, examination of witnesses, and closing arguments.' The
promised expert, whose link between the supposed preexisting condition and Joan's current injuries was the premise for this stream
of hints and innuendoes, never materialized."' The plaintiff was
left with the task of rebutting the shadows of a diagnosis that was
33. Karsten, 157 I11.App. 3d at 6-7, 509 N.E.2d at 1378.
34. Brief for Joan Karsten, supra note 28, at 20-27.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 37-38.
38. Karsten, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 8, 509 N.E.2d at 1380.
39. Id. at 10, 509 N.E.2d at 1381.
40. Id. at 6, 509 N.E.2d at 1379.
41. Id.
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never made and the opinion of an expert who never took the stand.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
In effect, Joan Karsten's trial was itself infected by a toxic
stream of prejudicial hints and references to a preexisting disease
that had no foundation in evidence. The appellate court found that
"defendants' breach of a promise to call a Witness to support statements made throughout the trial was itself prejudicial error."42 It
is obvious that defense counsel could not have carried out this type
of strategy without the support of plaintiff's treating physicians
and the careful preparation of their testimony.43 Ex parte contact
with those doctors to recruit them as defense witnesses and coordinate their testimony clearly was essential."
This situation, which conveniently might be labeled the Karsten
problem, is a one that plaintiffs' lawyers face all too frequently.
The plaintiff's doctor has huddled with defense counsel, but it is
unknown whether privileged information was disclosed. The doctor has thrown his or her allegiance to the defense, but it cannot be
known whether improper influences were at work. The testimony
itself violates no rule of evidence or privilege, and yet, the prejudice
to the plaintiff's case is devastating. In the eyes of jurors, the
plaintiff's own doctor is the most credible of witnesses, being most
intimately familiar with the patient's condition, ethically committed to the patient's best interests, and having no interest in the lawsuit. That the doctor testifies against the patient is in itself
damning. That this testimony conforms neatly with the defense
theory imparts an unmistakable ring of truth to speculations and
bare assertions that have little basis in the evidence.
Confidentiality, once breached, cannot be restored. The Karsten
problem involves preventing the subtle results of ex parte conferences from infecting the plaintiff's case in the minds of the jury.
The answer provided by the appellate court is clearly stated: "We
believe that plaintiffs in the instant action have adequately shown
prejudicial error such that they were denied a fair trial ....

Drs.

Menet and Dominguez should45have been barred from testifying at
the initial trial of this cause."

42. Id. at 9, 509 N.E.2d at 1381 (citing Charpentier v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill. App.
3d 988, 997, 502 N.E. 2d 385, 391 (1986)).
43. Brief for Joan Karsten, supra note 28, at 71.
44. "Plaintiffs do not suggest that a defendant be barred from ever calling a treating
physician. The method employed by defendants in this case, and the surreptitious recruitment of treating physicians as adverse witnesses, should be condemned." Brief for
Joan Karsten, supra note 28, at 66-67.
45. Karsten, 157 11. App. 3d at 8, 15, 509 N.E.2d at 1379, 1384.
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INTERVIEWS OF PLAINTIFF'S TREATING

PHYSICIAN: AN ASSAULT ON THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP

A.

The Confidentiality of the Physician-PatientRelationship and
the Scope of Implied Waiver of Patient Privilege

During the pendency of Joan Karsten's appeal, the appellate
46
court handed down its decision in Petrillov. Syntex Laboratories,
holding that ex parte contacts were contrary to public policy as
violating both the duty of confidentiality and the fiduciary duty of
physicians to patients. Petrillo provided the Karsten court with a
principled basis for decision, and the court adopted it without
reservation.47
Petrillo is a watershed in the evolution of judicial views concerning ex parte contacts. It marks the departure from a narrow view
of confidentiality, limited to the statutory physician-patient privilege, to one that recognizes and protects far broader public interests in safeguarding both the confidential and fiduciary nature of
the physician-patient relationship. An examination of this development is worthwhile.
Generally, the parties to a civil suit are entitled to discovery of
any relevant information that is not privileged. 4 Though patient

communications were not protected at common law, about forty
jurisdictions have enacted statutory privileges.4 9 Their primary
purpose is to protect public health by fostering the candid communication between patient and physician that is essential to effective
medical diagnosis and treatment.5 0 These statutes represent a
strong public interest in preserving the confidentiality of patient
46. 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (lst Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d
361, cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
47. Karsten, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 14, 509 N.E.2d at 1384.
48. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 and advisory committee note.
49. See, 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2380 (collecting and excerpting statutes).
The Illinois privilege is at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (1987). See Parkson v.
Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 854, 435 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1st Dist. 1982)
(privilege encourages "free disclosure between the physician and patient and protect[s]
the patient from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which disclosure would
entail").
50. See, e.g., Missouri ex. rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1989)
("The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to enable the patient to secure complete and appropriate medical treatment by encouraging candid communication between
patient and physician, free from fear of the possible embarrassment and invasion of privacy engendered by an unauthorized disclosure of information."); Duquette v. Superior
Ct., 161 Ariz. 269, 275 778 P.2d 634, 640 (Ct. App. 1989) (the purpose is to ensure that
"the patient will receive the best medical treatment by encouraging full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to his doctor" (quoting Lewin v.
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communications, worthy of judicial protection. 5 Academic writers, notably Dean Wigmore, have criticized the privilege, lamenting the loss of relevant evidence and expressing doubt that
confidentiality is that important to the general public.52 The public
and their lawmakers, however, are of a decidedly different view.
Not only has there been a clear lack of enthusiasm to repeal existing patient privileges,5 3 but state and federal laws and regulations during the past two decades have resulted in
"unprecedented" protection of the confidentiality of patient information. 54 Fear of social stigma associated with acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"), abortion, drug abuse, child abuse,

and other medical situations suggests that the principle that confidentiality is essential to candor is as valid as ever.55
Jackson, 108 Ariz 27, 31, 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972))). See also supra note 9, and accompanying text.
Although this "utilitarian" rationale is dominant, an important secondary basis is protection of the patient's right of privacy. Developments, supra note 10, at 1544; Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privilegesin FederalCourts: An Alternative to the ProposedFederal
Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973).
51. "We believe the public has a widespread belief that information given to a physician in confidence will not be disclosed to third parties absent legal compulsion, and we
further believe that the public has a right to have this expectation realized." Duquette,
161 Ariz. at 275, 778 P.2d at 640. See also Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 536 N.E.
2d 1126, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1989) (despite criticism, the patient privilege is supported by
strong public policy).
52. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2380a ("The injury to justice by the repression
of the facts of corporal injury and disease is much greater than any injury which might be
done by disclosure." In "actions for corporal injuries where the extent of the plaintiff's
injury is at issue .... the medical testimony is absolutely needed for the purpose of learning the truth."). See also, Chafee, Privileged Communications:Is Justice Served or Obstructed By Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
It should be recognized, however, that "no solid empirical data exists to support the
estimates of either critics or proponents as to either the costs or the benefits of privileges."
Developments, supra note 10, at 1474. Accord, Turkington, supra note 12, at 351.
53. See Turner, supra note 6, at 77 ("not one state has repealed its physician-patient
statute").
54. Turkington, supra note 12, at 263. One commentator finds that "protection of
confidential medical information is a more important concern now than it has been in the
past." Gellman, PrescribingPrivacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of PatientPrivacy, 62 N.C.L. REV. 255, 257, 278 (1984) (citing the extensive governmental studies and hearings on the issue and the numerous and varied state laws
governing patient information).
55. See, e.g., The Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Epidemic, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, 126 (1988) ("Rigorous maintenance of confidentiality is considered critical
to the success of the public health endeavor to prevent the transmission and spread of
HIV infection."); Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflections on
the Nature of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REV. 909 (1989) (rational and irrational
fear of AIDS leads to discrimination against victims); Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 (1986) ("A woman and her physi-
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Because the primary objection to the patient privilege is the loss
of relevant evidence, rather than the plaintiff's entire medical history, 56 the legislative response has been a very pragmatic one: lift
the veil of secrecy to the limited extent necessary to provide the
factfinder with the evidence necessary to resolve the issues in the
lawsuit. Nearly every jurisdiction that confers a medical privilege
also has adopted the "patient litigant" exception: the privilege does
not extend, or is deemed to be waived, as to matters relating to a
physical condition that the patient places in issue in litigation. 7
Hence, by filing a complaint seeking damages for personal injury
(or death), plaintiff relinquishes, to a limited extent, the protection
of the privilege.5 8 The nature and scope of this waiver provides the
key to the confidentiality controversy regarding ex parte contacts. 9
For the courts that permit ex parte contacts, the fact of waiver
generally ends the matter. Frequently cited is an early federal case,
Doe v. Eli Lilly & Company,60 in which the court held that the
manufacturer of diethylstilbestrol ("DES") was entitled to conduct
ex parte discussions with the physicians of plaintiffs allegedly injured by the drug. In the district judge's view, waiver removed any
distinction between a treating physician and any other witness.61
Other courts have followed this reasoning to conclude that the patient-litigant exception removes any bar against ex parte contacts
with plaintiff's treating physician. 62 Because the rules of civil procian will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abortion if there exists a possibility
that her decision and her identity will become known publicly."); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 595 (1977) (state requirement to report prescriptions of certain narcotics led
some patients to discontinue treatment or obtain prescriptions out-of-state to avoid being
labeled "drug addicts"). On the human tendency to transfer fear of disease to those
afflicted, see S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978).

56.

8 J.

WIGMORE,

supra note 8, at § 2380a.

57. See Id. at § 2389 (collecting statutes and decisional authority); Donaldson, Henson & Jordan, JurisdictionalSurvey of Tort Provisions of Washington's 1986 Tort Reform
Act, 22 GONZAGA L. REV. 47, 55 n.35 (1986/87) (collecting statutes); Annotation, Commencing Action Involving Physical Condition of Plaintiff or Decedent As Waiving Physician-PatientPrivilege As To Discovery Proceedings,21 A.L.R.3d 912 (1968).
58. "The situation in which a patient loses the privilege because she affirmatively
places her physical or emotional condition at issue is technically a 'waiver' because the
availability of the privilege depends on the actions of the patient." Developments, supra
note 10, at 1537 n.39.
59. In those few jurisdiction in which a plaintiff does not automatically waive the
privilege by filing suit, any unconsented discussion with plaintiff's physician is, of course,
impermissible. E.g., Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 429 N.W.2d 891 (1988),
appeal denied, 432 Mich. 912 (1989).
60. 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983).
61. Id. at 128.
62. E.g., Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) ("Once
the physician-patient privilege has been waived, the physician becomes available for inter-
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cedure do not expressly forbid ex parte communications, this reasoning goes, the court is without authority to forbid them.63
Silence, however, is ambiguous. Other courts hold with equal
force that, because the rules do not authorize ex parte contacts, the
practice is not acceptable. 64 Neither position is satisfactory, because both essentially shift to the legislature the task of resolving
an issue that is clearly within the expertise of the judiciary. 65 Most
courts, therefore, have addressed the issue as a judicial matter to be
decided on public policy grounds.66
Courts in a growing number of jurisdictions have attacked the
fairly obvious fundamental fallacy of Doe and its followers. 67 The
patient-litigant exception does not deprive the patient of the protection of the privilege entirely. The waiver is limited to matters
relating to the physical condition plaintiff has put in issue. 68 Also,

the patient is everywhere the holder of the privilege, entitled to
view just like any other witness."); Orr v. Sievert, 162 Ga. App. 677, 679-80, 292 S.E.2d
548, 550 (1982) ("Once a patient places his care and treatment at issue in a civil proceedingf], there no longer remains any restraint upon a doctor in the release of medical information concerning the patient within the parameters of the cpmplaint."); Langdon v.
Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734
(1987); Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465 (1983); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 631, 558 A.2d
532 (1989).
Courts have employed the same reasoning to permit ex parte contacts in states having
no physician-patient privilege. E.g., Romine v. Medicenters of America, 476 So. 2d 51
(Ala. 1985); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Trans-World Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1976);
Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So.
2d 858 (Fla. 1984).
64. See, e.g., Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D. 1981); Fields v. McNamara,
189 Colo. 284, 540 P.2d 327 (1975); Jaap v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981);
Johnson v. District Court, 738 P.2d 151 (Okla. 1987); Wisconsin ex rel. Klieger v. Alby,
125 Wis. 2d 468, 373 N.W.2d 57 (1985). Cf Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp.,
107 F.R.D. 35, 38 n.7 (D.D.C. 1985) (ex parte interviews "incongruous" with the thrust
of Rule 35).
65. One court framed the issue somewhat differently: "The addition of a new discovery method, the court enforced waiver of privilege leading to ex parte informal interviews
with physicians, should be accomplished by a change in the Rules of Civil Procedure,
rather than by judicial fiat." Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d
353, 356 (Iowa 1986).
66. Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. 1989) ("the mere
silence of the Rules is not determinative. A public policy assessment is required to resolve the question").
67. The continuing validity of Doe is questionable in light of Alston v. Greater
Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1985), which prohibited ex parte
discussions.
68. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2389; Developments, supra note 10, at 1537;
Turkington, supra note 12, at 308-09. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 756
P.2d 138, 140 (1988). Even courts that permit exparte contacts recognize that the scope
of the waiver of the patient privilege extends only to matters relevant to the condition
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assert its protection as to those matters not within the limited
waiver. Ex parte discussions deprive patients of this right.69 In the
absence of the plaintiff's counsel, there is a genuine risk that the
physician will disclose privileged information. 70 The doctor, untrained in the law, is ill-equipped to determine whether specific information is within the scope of the waiver, and defense counsel
not only does not know the contents of the doctor's answers, but
has no reason to enforce the privilege on behalf of the patient.7 '
Therefore, a ban against ex parte discussions is essential to preserve
the limited scope of the inquiry and guard against disclosure of
matters that remain privileged. 72 The presence of the plaintiff's
counsel also serves to protect doctors against breach of ethics and
possible tort liability for unauthorized disclosures.73
This reasoning, while a welcome reaffirmation of the rights of
patients, does not resolve the Karsten problem. True, a plaintiff
that plaintiff has placed in issue. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1373
(Alaska 1987), 745 P.2d at 1373.
69. See Wisconsin ex rel. Klieger v. Alby, 125 Wis. 2d 468, 474, 373 N.W.2d 57, 61
(1985) ("If the court orders private conferences outside the scope of discovery, the patient
loses control of the privilege, a result the statutes clearly do not contemplate."); Jaap v.
District Court, 623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981); King & Hall, supra note 6, at 262.
70. See Ryan, 776 S.W.2d at 394 ("The first and most obvious danger is that the
discussion may result in the disclosure of irrelevant, privileged medical information.");
Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d at 678, 756 P.2d at 140 ("The danger of an ex parte interview is
that it may result in disclosure of irrelevant, privileged medical information.").
71. See Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa
1986), ("We are concerned, however, with the difficulty of determining whether a particular piece of information is relevant to the claim being litigated. Placing the burden of
determining relevancy on an attorney, who does not know the nature of the confidential
disclosure about to be elicited, is risky. Asking the physician, untrained in the law, to
assume this burden is a greater gamble and is unfair to the physician."); Duquette v.
Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 276, 778 P.2d 634, 641 (Ct. App. 1989) ("resolution of
that dispute is left to the defense attorney and the physician witness. We believe that this
scenario places both the defense attorney and the physician in an untenable position");
see also Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.
2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1979); Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138.
72. See Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Mutter v.
Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1988); and authorities cited supra, notes 70 & 71.
73. See Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276, 778 P.2d at 641 ("a physician who allows himself
to be interviewed ex parte embarks, perhaps unknowingly, on a course which may involve
a breach of professional ethics and potential liability"); Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 411, 240
N.W.2d at 337 ("The presence of the patient's attorney during the doctor's examination
also helps protect the doctor from unwittingly and improperly disclosing medical information about his patient. We note without deciding that a physician who discloses confidential information about his patient to another in a private interview may be subject to
tort liability for breach of his patient's right to privacy or to professional discipline for
unprofessional conduct."); Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37
(D.D.C. 1985) (same); Annotation, Physician's Tort Liabilityfor UnauthorizedDisclosure
of Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R.4th 668 (1986).
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who learns of defense counsel's intent to meet with the plaintiff's
doctor can block the interview based on the danger of violating the
privilege. 74 But in the more common circumstance, the plaintiff
learns of the ex parte discussions long after the fact, when the more
immediate concern is infection of the plaintiff's fair trial. Even if
counsel can show that privileged communications were divulged, a
court is likely to conclude that, because the patient was afforded
the opportunity to assert the privilege at trial, any improper disclosure did not affect the verdict."
A rule based solely on protecting the privilege does not address
the root of the Karsten problem, which is not the substance of the
disclosures by the plaintiff's doctors but the very fact that clandestine meetings occurred and allowed defense counsel to recruit and
prepare the doctors as witnesses against their own patient. Plaintiffs are in the ironic position of having a right to lock the door
against invasion by defense lawyers but without a way of knowing
that they are coming in and no remedy for the damage they do.
By grounding its prohibition against ex parte communications in
the strong public policy of preserving both the confidential and fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship, Petrillo provided the Karsten court with a far more effective means of
safeguarding the rights of the patient as plaintiff. This public policy, the Petrillo court discerned, is neither created nor limited by
the statutory medical privilege. It "arises from the fact that society
possesses an established and beneficial interest in the sanctity of the
physician-patient relationship." ' 76 In the court's view, two separate

indicia reflect that public policy: the ethical obligation of the medical profession to protect patient confidentiality, and the fiduciary
74. See, e.g., Fields v. McNamara, 189 Colo. 284, 540 P.2d 327 (1975); Roosevelt
Hotel, 394 N.W.2d 353; Wenninger, 307 Minn. at 405, 240 N.W.2d at 333; Ryan, 776
S.W.2d 389; Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); Smith v. Ashby, 106
N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987); cf Duquette, 161 Ariz. 269, 778 P.2d 634 (order precluding testimony of doctors vacated in view of previously unsettled state of the law).
75. See Yates v. El-Deity, 160 Ill. App. 3d 198, 513 N.E.2d 519, 523 (3d Dist. 1987),
appeal denied, 520 N.E.2d 394 (1988) (defense contended that "because the plaintiff was
unable to show that improper conduct or actual prejudice to her resulted from the ex
parte communications, she is not entitled to a new trial"); Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio
App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465 (1983) (plaintiff unable to show that improper discussions
occurred or that they prejudiced the trial); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549
A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 631, 558 A.2d 532 (1989) ("If disclosures
are neither pertinent nor material, they will be inadmissible at trial."). Indeed, the court
may prevent plaintiff from discovering what was discussed during the ex parte meeting.
See Farage, supra note 1, at 13-15.
76. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587 499 N.E.2d 952, 957
(1st Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo,
483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
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obligation of physicians to their patients recognized by law.77
The promulgated code of ethics that governs the medical profession, "and upon which the public relies to be faithfully executed so
as to protect the confidential relationship between a patient and his
physician,"" is composed of three prongs. First, the Hippocratic
Oath, conceived in the fifth century B.C. and solemnly recited by
every medical school graduate today, acknowledges the obligation
to keep a patient's confidences in trust. 9 Secondly, the AMA's
Principles of Medical Ethics dictate that the physician owes the
patient an obligation of honesty as well as confidentiality.80 Finally, the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA
emphasize that the consent of the patient is essential before any
disclosure of information."' Ex parte discussions without the patient's consent destroy the confidential relationship between physi82
cian and patient.
The legislature's adoption of the medical privilege and the patient-litigant exception reflects "both society's desire for privacy3
'8
and its desire to see that the truth is reached in civil disputes.
This leads the court logically and inevitably to a crucial insight
regarding the scope of the privilege:
Of key importance is the legislature's determination that it be the
patient who, by affirmative conduct, (the filing of a lawsuit) con77. Id.
78. Id.
79. "Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not in connection with
it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken abroad, I will not
divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." 1 HIPPOCRATES 164-65 (W.
Jones trans. 1923). See also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio 1965) ("Almost evei-y member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this
warranty of silence.").
80. Principle II provides: "A physician shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues .... " Principle IV states: "A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of
colleagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences
within the constraints of the law." American Medical Association, Principles of Medical
Ethics (1977). For a historical view of the development of the AMA code of ethics, see
Gellman, supra note 54, at 267-71.
81. "The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship
between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree.. . . The
physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law." Judicial Council, American Medical Association, Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the American
Medical Association § 5.05 (1984). "The patient's history, diagnosis, treatment, and
prognosis may be discussed with the patient's lawyer with the consent of the patient ..
Id. § 5.06.
82. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959.
83. Id. at 603, 499 N.E.2d at 967.
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sents to the disclosure of his previously confidential medical information. Thus, members of the public who file suit regarding a
specific condition realize that upon doing so, the information regarding that condition will be lawfully disclosed not only to their
adversary, but to the public forum as well. 4
This insight cuts through the Karsten problem. The legislature
did not intend the waiver "to apply to anything more than the information necessary to ascertain the truth." 5 The plaintiff waives
confidentiality only as to the information itself, not as to the means
the defendant may employ to obtain it. Because all relevant information can be obtained in formal discovery, the purpose of the
waiver is thereby satisfied. There is no societal interest to be served
by permitting the further loss of confidentiality represented by ex
parte communications.8 6 Therefore, it follows that:
The patient's implicit consent .

.

. is obviously and necessarily

limited; he consents only to the release of his medical information
(relative to the lawsuit) pursuant to the methods of discovery authorized by Supreme Court Rule 201(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 201(A)). A
patient certainly does not, by simply filing suit, consent to his
physician discussing that patient's medical confidences with third
parties outside court authorized discovery methods, nor does he
consent to his physician discussing the patient's confidences in an
ex parte conference with the patient's legal adversary. 87
A measure of the soundness of this insight is found in its adoption
in subsequent decisions.8 8
B.

FiduciaryNature of the Physician-PatientRelationship

The second indicia of the public policy prohibiting ex parte conferences, in the Petrillo analysis, is the well-settled fiduciary relationship between physician and patient. The special trust that a
patient places in a physician gives rise to a legal duty of good
84.
85.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis added).

86.

Id.

87. Id. at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959 (emphasis in original).
88. See, e.g., Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(prohibition against ex parte contacts "affects defense counsel's methods, not the substance of what is discoverable"); Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 272, 778
P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1980) ("even where the physician-patient privilege has been
impliedly waived, the holder of the privilege waives only his right to object to discovery of
pertinent medical information which is sought through the formal methods of discovery
authorized by the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure") (emphasis in original); Roosevelt
Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 1986) (filing suit "only
waives the application of the privilege, which is confined ... to a testimonial setting, and
does not speak to ex parte communications in a nontestimonial setting").
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faith. 89
There is an implied promise, arising when the physician begins
treating the patient, that the physician will refrain from engaging
in conduct that is inconsistent with the "good faith" required of a
fiduciary. The patient should, we believe, be able to trust that the
physician will act in the best interests of the patient thereby protecting the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship. 9

The court concluded that ex parte conferences violate the duty
of a fiduciary. The patient:
should have the right to expect that his physician will provide the
medical information sought by the patient's adversary pursuant
only to court authorized methods of discovery.9 1

Of great potential significance to plaintiffs facing the Karsten
problem is the court's interpretation of the fiduciary duty of physicians as extending beyond the obligation to act in the best medical
interests of the patient to include the duty, at minimum, to avoid
conduct that is adverse to the patient's legal interests.9 2 The
court's citations to Miles v. Farrell and Alexander v. Knight are
instructive. The court in Alexander stated:
Physicians owe their patients more than just medical care for
which payment is exacted; there is a duty of total care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in litigation, to
render reports when necessary and to attend court when needed.
That further includes a duty to refuse affirmative assistance to
the patient's antagonist in litigation. 93

Miles is a case of considerable interest in its own right as a precursor of Karsten. In Miles, the plaintiff's doctor continued to
treat the plaintiff after agreeing to testify as an expert witness for
the defense in the patient's malpractice action. The district court
granted the plaintiff's motion to bar the doctor from testifying at
89. "The relationship between physician and patient is 'a fiduciary one of the highest
degree... involv[ing] every element of trust, confidence and good faith.'" Loudon v.
Mhyre 110 Wash.2d 675, 679, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (1988) (quoting Lockett v. Goodill, 71
Wash. 2d 654, 656, 430 P.2d 589 (1967)). See also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("all reported cases dealing with this point hold
that the relationship of physician and patient is a fiduciary one," citing cases); Duquette,
161 Ariz. 269, 778 P.2d 634; Missouri ex. rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Mo.
1989) (" 'A physician occupies a position of trust and confidence as regards his patient a fiduciary position. It is his duty to act with the utmost good faith' ") (quoting Moore v.
Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. App. 1961)).
90. Petrillo, 148 111. App. 3d at 595, 499 N.E.2d at 961.
91. Id. (emphasis in original)(citing Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962)).
92. Id.
93. Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962).
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trial. It is likely, the district court indicated, "that a physician
owes a duty of loyalty to his patient which would prevent him from
testifying as an expert against his patient.

'94

The Petrillo court's

reference to Alexander and Miles is a clear indication that, in the
court's view, the fiduciary duty owed a patient may include a duty
to refrain from testifying as an expert for the patient's legal
adversary.
Assessing the impact of ex parte interviews on the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship is far more useful, both
conceptually and pragmatically, than focusing solely on confidential communications.95 Thus, even in states that do not recognize a
medical privilege, courts have banned ex parte contacts as violative
of the fiduciary physician-patient relationship. 96 Following Petrillo, courts increasingly have looked beyond the confines of the
evidentiary patient privilege to recognize that this practice violates
both the confidential
and fiduciary aspects of the physician's duty
97
to the patient.

For plaintiffs seeking just compensation for injury, the immediate concern is the impact of the doctor's breach of trust on the
jury. By asserting the privilege at trial to exclude improper testimony, capable trial counsel can minimize the impact that disclosure of privileged matters has on the jury. Karsten demonstrates,
however, that a physician whose loyalty is no longer undividedly
with the patient can wreak havoc on the fairness of the plaintiff's
94. Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp. 82, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See also Hammonds v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("It cannot be questioned that part of a doctor's duty of total care requires him to offer his medical testimony on behalf of his patient if the patient becomes involved in litigation over the injury
or illness which the doctor treated. Thus, during the course of such litigation, in addition
to the duty of secrecy, there arises the duty of undivided loyalty.").
95. One district judge noted the changed direction of the law subsequent to Petrillo.
The prohibition against ex parte contacts is "an emerging court-created effort to preserve
the treating physician's fiduciary responsibilities during the litigation process," and
"completely separate and distinct from the statutory physician-patient privilege.
Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
96. E.g., Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987).
97. See, e.g., Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 275, 778 P.2d 634, 640 (Ct.
App. 1980), 161 ("We believe that ex parte communications between defense attorneys
and plaintiffs' treating physicians would be destructive of both the confidential and fiduciary natures of the physician-patient relationship."); Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776
S.W.2d 389, 393 (Mo. 1989) ("Although the patient is deemed to have waived the statutory privilege with regard to certain information, the ongoing confidential and fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient continues to require protection from conduct
that might jeopardize the sanctity of that relationship."); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171
Mich. App. 328, 429 N.W.2d 891 (1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 912 (1989); Smith v.
Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756
P.2d 138 (1988).
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trial without disclosing a single confidence. Jurors are inclined to
credit the physician with the fiduciary good faith they observe in
their own doctors. In reality, the physician may well have divided
loyalties.
Meetings shrouded in secrecy provide fertile ground for all manner of mischief. The plaintiff's obvious fear is that defense counsel
will influence the physician's testimony. It is no slur on the medical profession to state that doctors are particularly vulnerable to
defense counsel's influence. A sad consequence of the heated "insurance crisis" controversy is that, when it comes to litigation, a
doctor may be persuaded for reasons of professional and economic
self-interest to assist the defense. As one court notes:
This court will not overlook the current concerns in the medical
malpractice insurance industry and the attitudes of physicians
and carriers alike. An unauthorized ex parte interview could disintegrate into a discussion of the impact of a jury's award upon a
physician's professional reputation, the rising cost of malpractice
insurance premiums, the notion that the treating physician might
be the next person to be sued, and other topics which might influence the treating physician's views. The potential for impropriety grows even larger when defense counsel represents the
treating physician's own insurance carrier. . .. "I

This danger is particularly acute in the area of medical malpractice, where, in many states, a majority of physicians are insured by
the same carrier.
We also note that in Arizona, a substantial number of physicians
are insured by a single "doctor-owned" insurer ... the physician

witness may feel compelled to participate in the ex parte interview because the insurer defending the medical malpractice defendant may also insure the physician witness. 99
One plaintiff's attorney described the scenario more graphically:
98. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d at 395 (quoting Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 594-95). In Manion,
defense counsel had represented two of plaintiff's treating physicians in prior malpractice
cases; following the ex parte meetings both became witnesses for the defense and refused
further contact with plaintiff. 676 F. Supp. at 587 nn. 1-2. The tactic of turning the
physician against the patient-plaintiff is not uncommon. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae
Arizona Trial Lawyers Assoc., at 28-30, Duquette, 161 Ariz. 269, 778 P.2d 634 (citing
instances from trial courts).
99. Duquette, 161 Ariz. at 276, 778 P.2d at 641; see also Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.
2d 148, 153, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979) ("Moreover, a doctor who is himself insured
by the same carrier that insurers a defendant may wrongfully 'feel compelled to make
improper disclosures to the carrier. Compliance with formal discovery procedures would
insulate a physician against such improper pressures."); 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

8.02 (1984 Supp.) (ex parte conferences invite questionable

conduct and improper influences on physician who is often insured by same carrier and
knows defense attorney); Ward, Pre-Trial Waiver of the Physician/PatientPrivilege, 22
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Indeed, we have heard on more than one occasion of investigators approaching a plaintiff's physician as follows: "Doctor, I'm
calling you on behalf of the Medical Malpractice Defense Insurance Company. Our records show that you are insured with us,
just as Dr. X, who is being sued by your patient, John Doe. Doctor X is in the same specialty as yourself, a member of your professional risk pool. We do not believe that Doctor X did
anything wrong. Perhaps you would be so kind as to tell us what
you know of patient John Doe and of Dr. X's treatment, so that
we can effectively mount a defense for Dr. X, thereby helping us
keep malpractice premiums down." The not-so-subtle point that
it is in the physician's financial interest to help his insurer defeat
his patient's claim is not lost of the physician."
This conflict of interest was a source of prejudice in Karsten. The
court observed that:
Dr. Menet wore two hats and those two persons were diametrically opposed to each other. He was an attending physician of
Joan Karsten, a confidant and fiduciary of a disabled and brain
damaged woman, cloaked with the credibility that position endows. This capacity, however, he chose to ignore, or at best, subvert to his position as an employee, an officer and a shareholder
in the defendant corporation of which the defendant physicians
were fellow shareholders and officers.' 0 '
At the very least, some courts have noted, the physician may become reluctant to testify on behalf of the plaintiff. 0 2 It is no answer that ethical rules deal with abuses, occurring as they do in
secret.10 3 Providing the occasion for a breach of confidence and
fiduciary duty should itself be condemned. Sunlight, it has been
GONZAGA L. REV. 59, 64 (1986/87) (defense counsel may have prior professional relationships with plaintiff's physician).
100. Bower, supra, note 6, at 32. Defense counsel apparently view the ex parte conference as a legitimate opportunity to persuade the doctor to testify against the patient.
"The primary practical effect of a rule prohibiting ex parte conferences between defense
counsel and a plaintiff's treating physicians is to prevent a defendant from utilizing the
treating physician as an expert witness." Brief for Contemnor, at 24, Petrillo v. Syntex
Labs., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1986).
101. Brief for Joan Karsten, supra note 28, at 69-70.
102. Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37 (D.D.C. 1985);
Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981).
103. Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 679, 756 P.2d 138, 140-41, (1988) (protective orders would also burden the courts with supervising every ex parte interview for
compliance). As one plaintiff's lawyer argues: "But how can plaintiff's attorney get a
protective order before he knows that an ex parte meeting is even contemplated, or, indeed, has been held. Obtaining a protective order after the ex parte interview is over is
hardly protective. It is locking the barn after the horse has been stolen." Farage, supra
note 1, at 7.
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observed, is a powerful disinfectant. 10 4 The plaintiff's attorney
should be present both to detect and deter improper influence.
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF Ex PAR TE
CONTACTS

Proponents of ex parte interviews themselves raise public policy

considerations. The various arguments fall almost invariably into
three categories: greater access to the truth, more cost-efficient discovery, and protection of defense counsel's work product. Some
proponents also argue that it is simply unfair to deprive the defense
of the same access to the plaintiff's physician that the plaintiff's
counsel enjoys. These assertions are, at best, dubious.
The access-to-truth rationale was articulated ably by the defense
attorney in Petrillo:

The treating physician is often the person most capable of refuting a plaintiff's unfounded claims. If the treating physician's information and opinions are not equally available to both sides,
the total flow of probative information is decreased, and consequently early evaluation and settlement of cases is made much
less likely, and the burden on already crowded court dockets will
be increased.10-5

A number of courts have accepted this assertion." Yet, the argument founders on a single indisputable fact: ex parte interviews
cannot provide defense counsel with any legitimate information
104. Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 274, 778 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. 1980),
("Although it is true that any discovery device is subject to abuse, realistically, we believe
that the presence of the plaintiff's attorney at an interview between plaintiff's treating
physicians and defense attorneys will substantially reduce the potential for abuse.").
105. Brief for Contemnor at 21, Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952. Implicit in this argument, of course, is the premise that plaintiffs are so likely to lie that
extraordinary countermeasures are warranted. One of the Karsten defendants is even
more blunt: "It is common knowledge that plaintiffs in personal injury actions often do
not tell the truth in making their claims." Brief for Defendant-Appellee Asselmeier at 39,
Karsten, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376.
106. See, Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) ("no party to
litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness's evidence"); TransWorld Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976) ("informal methods
are to be encouraged, for they facilitate early evaluation and settlement of cases, with a
resulting decrease in litigation costs, and represent further the wise application of judicial
resources"); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1258-59 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) ("encourage the production of evidence"); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549
A.2d 950, 958-59 (1988), appeal denied 521 Pa. 631, 558 A.2d 532 (1989) ("Meritless
medical malpractice claims can be disposed of at the earliest possible stage of litigation
by allowing free access to material and relevant facts once a claimant has filed suit."). See
also, Hayes & Monahan, supra note 6, at 11.
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that counsel could not obtain by other means. The Petrillo court
answers the defense argument this way:
It is not the ex parte conference in and of itself that leads to the
early settlement of a case. Rather, it is the information that is
obtained during that ex parte conference that leads to a case's
settlement.... [Formal discovery] will provide defense counsel
with the same information that they would obtain in an ex parte
conference (and thus facilitate the early evaluation and settlethat physician's fiduciary obment of cases) without jeopardizing
07
ligation to his patient.

The Karsten court emphasized this point:
We note that in Petrillo, defense counsel could not identify a single piece of information or evidence that he would be able to obtain through a witness interview that he could not obtain through
conventional methods of discovery. Similarly, in the instant case,
defendants obtained nothing through their interview of Joan's
treating physicians they could not have obtained through regular
discovery methods. The fact that a party may obtain the same
information through formal discovery as can be obtained informally supports the use of discovery when it is necessary to protect
a privileged communication, such as between a physician and
patient. o8

Indeed, there is no reported case in which defense counsel could
point to information that could not have been obtained in formal
discovery. 109 Some have argued that ex parte interviews are preferable because the physician is likely to be more candid and spontaneous in his or her remarks." 0 Spontaneity is not often a
characteristic that is highly prized in one's physician. More to the
point, it is precisely this danger, that the physician will inadvertently disclose privileged information, that requires the presence of
plaintiff's counsel."' Thus, the contention that ex parte contacts
107. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 601, 499 N.E.2d at 965-66 (emphasis in original).
See also, Missouri ex reL Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. 1989) ("As for early
evaluation and settlement of a case, it is the information obtained, rather than the ex
parte discussion itself, that leads to resolution.").
108. Karsten, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 14, 509 N.E.2d at 1384 (emphasis in original).
109. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 344, 429 N.W.2d 891, 899
(1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 912 (1989) ("The fact that defense attorneys are able to
obtain all relevant evidence via the discovery rules shows that there is no need for ex
parte interviews."); Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 111, 534 A.2d 720, 723 (1987) ("The
defendant has given us no reason to believe that he cannot obtain all necessary information through the formal discovery methods for which our procedural rules provide.");
Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987) (similar).
110. Ex parte discussion "is conducive to spontaneity and candor in a way deposiDoe, 99 F.R.D. at 128.
tions can never be ....
111. Karsten, 157 Il1.App. 3d at 14, 509 N.E.2d at 1384.
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provide greater access to truth, with all the concomitant benefits of
detection of fraud, early settlements, and trimming court dockets,
is specious.
The argument that ex parte conferences are more cost-efficient
stands on no firmer ground. Proponents argue that the practice is
far less expensive and time consuming than formal discovery methods." 2 Not all defense attorneys enjoy a reputation of frugality
with client expenses, but there is some merit to these concerns,
particularly where the case involves several physicians in distant
locations. Fortunately, depositions are not the sole alternative to
ex parte interviews. As several courts have pointed out, interrogatories and depositions upon written questions are less expensive
substitutes." 3 Frequently, plaintiffs may consent to defense counsel's informal interview of the physician provided that plaintiff's
attorney is present. 114 Moreover, as another court states, ex parte
discussions do not necessarily conserve judicial resources. I
Indeed, it may be anticipated that widespread use of ex parte
112. See, e.g., Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128 ("it is less costly and less likely to entail logistical or scheduling problems"); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985) (similar);- Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 455, 480 A.2d 223, 229
(1984) ("It is not only costly to all parties to litigation but it may be impractical and
inefficient to produce all treating doctors for depositions without knowing in advance
whether their testimony will be useful or helpful in resolving disputed issues."); Moses v.
McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 631,
558 A.2d 532 (1989) ("a cost-efficient method of eliminating non-essential witnesses in a
case where a plaintiff might have a number of treating physicians").
113. See Missouri ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. 1989) ("The
information obtained by ex parte discussion can be obtained through the discovery devices specifically enumerated in the Rules, for example, production of documents or depositions upon oral examination or written question. Moreover, there is nothing to
prevent plaintiff's counsel from agreeing to an informal interview with both counsel present."); see also Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 37 n.3
(D.D.C. 1985) ("any meaningful information could also be ascertained preliminarily by a
few questions using the procedure of deposition upon written questions pursuant to Rule
31"); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988), (similar); Smith v.
Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987) (suggesting written interrogatories).
114. See, e.g., Jaap v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981); Smith, 106 N.M.
358, 743 P.2d 114.
115. In Ryan, the court stated:
It is not clear that ex parte discussion ultimately results in the conservation of
resources. The defendant must expend time and effort to prepare the authorization and move for the court order compelling execution. The defendant will
spend further time and effort to secure and review the plaintiff's medical
records so that the defendant has an intelligent basis upon which to have an ex
parte discussion with the physician. Simultaneously, the plaintiff must respond
to the motions and orders and brief the physician on the limits of permissible
disclosure. The physician, in turn, must cull the patient's records, confer with
the patient's attorney, and then confer with the defendant's attorney. It is likely
that the physician will later be questioned by the plaintiff's attorney about the
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interviews may lead to more litigation, rather than less. The physician risks violating professional ethics and incurring tort liability
for unauthorized disclosure.I 6 The defendant's insurer may also
face liability for inducing a breach of confidentiality." 7 There is a
genuine potential for "satellite" lawsuits that would not otherwise
arise." 8 Ex parte contacts also foster greater use of protective orders, 1 and gives plaintiffs an incentive to engage in a "preemptive
first strike" by deposing treating physicians 20as early as possible to
guard against later inconsistent testimony.
Even if it could be demonstrated that the interviews would save
some time and money for defendants, it is hardly self-evident that
these interests outweigh the societal interests in protecting the confidential and
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
2
relationship. ' '

Further, it is argued that the right to interview without the presdiscussion. Notwithstanding this time and effort, defendant still may deem it
prudent to depose the physician.
776 S.W.2d at 394.
116. Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973). See generally Note,
Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982); Annotation,
supra note 13, at 1109.
117. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, on reconsideration
of 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d
582 (1979).
118. See Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 585, 596 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(expressing concern whether reliance on separate tort actions to safeguard confidentiality
"adequately protects the plaintiff/patient and his treating physician and whether it encourages unnecessary litigation"); Anker, 98 Misc. 2d at 153, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585 ("A
rule against the private interviews obtained in the case at bar will reduce unnecessary
lawsuits for wrongful disclosure against doctors and insurers.")
119. Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d at 679, 756 P.2d at 141 (resort to protective orders would
be routine in every ex parte situation).
120. Bower, supra note 6, at 36 (" 'preemptive first strike' of interviewing or deposing
plaintiff's physicians at the initiation of suit "so that neither side is caught by surprise by
the doctors' position at trial"). Ex parte interviews also present the potential problem
that defense counsel will be placed in the position of witness. See Alston v. Greater
Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 1985) ("ex parte interviews could
put a lawyer in the potential role of being a witness as to a damaging admission by a
doctor or as an impeachment witness, should a doctor give testimony different significantly from what he told the lawyer in the informal interview"); Nelson v. Lewis, 130
N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987) (same); Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (same).
121. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 274, 778 P.2d at 639 (Ct. App. 1980)
("we do not believe that such practical concerns as cost efficiency and ease of scheduling
are of paramount concern to a proper resolution of the issue"); Missouri ex rel. Woytus v.
Ryan, 776 S.W.2d at 389, 395 (Mo. 1989); Nelson, 130 N.H. at 111, 534 A.2d at 723
(While ex parte interviews may be less expensive and time-consuming, "these interests are
insignificant when compared with the patient-plaintiff's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of personal and possibly embarrassing information, irrelevant to the determination of the case being tried.").
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ence of opposing counsel is necessary to protect the work product
of defense counsel. 122 Plaintiff's attorney, it is claimed, might be
able to deduce defense theories and strategies from the questions
put to the treating physician.' 23 This is an extraordinarily broad
definition of work product, which is generally held to protect the
attorney's notes and memoranda reflecting the mental impressions
or theories the attorney has formed. 124 The implication that the
court should go to such lengths to enable the defense to conduct
trial by ambush is "out of step with modern discovery."' 125 Additionally, the argument proves far too much. If counsel's questions
are protected work product, all deposition practice - as well as
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and most other forms of
discovery under the rules - would be suspect.
Finally, some proponents argue, it is unfair to prohibit defense
counsel from ex parte contacts with the plaintiff's physician while
permitting unlimited access of the plaintiff's attorney. 26 The notion that there should be a mutuality of access overlooks the fact
that the physician is not a neutral witness. He or she owes a preexisting duty of confidentiality to the patient-plaintiff. Meetings with
plaintiff's counsel jeopardize no duty to the defendant. It is only
the rights of plaintiffs that are at risk.
V.

SCOPE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULE AGAINST
Ex PARTE CONTACTS

A.

Scope of the Ban: How Big an Umbrella

The Petrillo court based the rule against ex parte contacts on the
public policy interests in preserving the sanctity of the physicianpatient relationship, without any indication that this policy might
vary with the particular connection between the physician and the
litigation. 27 Nevertheless, one defense attorney has suggested in a
122. See McVisk, supra note 6, at 828; Hayes & Monahan, supra note 6, at 10.
123. Id. See also Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 90 F.R.D. 126, 128-29 (D.D.C. 1983); Missouri ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
124. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
125. See Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d at 353, 358 (Iowa
1986) ("Arguments based on invasion of attorney work product and trial strategy are
unpersuasive and somewhat out of tune with our modern discovery process."); Loudon,
110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (similar).
126. See Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128-29. This argument was forcefully made by defendant
in Karsten. Brief for McCray at 58, Karsten, 157 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376.
127. Given the growing importance of members of the allied health professions in the
health care delivery system, it might well be argued that society has a beneficial interest in
preserving the confidentiality of communications to, for example, nurses. See Turkington, supra note 12, at 309-10 (advocating protection of confidential communications to
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recent article the situations to which the prohibition should not
apply:
[F]irst, when the physician to be interviewed is a party to the
litigation or might become a party to a suit; second, when the
physician is employed by a party or potential party; and third,
was involved in the events out of which the
when the physician
12 8
suit arose.
The opinions in Petrillo and Karsten give no support for these exceptions. 129 Moreover, none of the reasons offered in their support
is consistent with the public policy basis for the ban on ex parte
contacts.
That the defendant in a medical malpractice case is entitled to
confer with counsel without the presence of plaintiff's attorney is
beyond argument, though for reasons that have little to do with
Petrillo. The plaintiff's waiver of the patient privilege is not the
litigant exception, but rather it is the separate statutory waiver applicable to filing an action against one's physician. 30 The purpose
of the waiver is to enable the defendant to prepare the case and to
protect the attorney-client relationship. The scope of implied consent is coextensive with these broad purposes.
This same reasoning, however, militates against an exception for
a doctor "who fears that legal action might be undertaken against
him for an incident which occurred during the course of treatment." 3 The primary rationale for the exception, that the doctor
who must wait until suit is filed may be unable to remember important details, 32 is rather weak. Doctors record important matters
nonphysician health professionals). See also Hadley, Nurses and PrescriptiveAuthority: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 15 AM. J. OF LAW & MED. 245 (1989).
Petrillo,however, relies heavily on "the physician's unique role in society." Petrillo v.
Syntex Labs., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 593, 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal
denied, 505 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
Cf Tomasovic v. American Honda Motor Co., 171 Ill. App. 3d 979, 525 N.E.2d 1111,
appeal denied, 122 111. 2d 595, 530 N.E.2d 266 (1988) (Petrillo rule not applicable to
emergency room intern who took plaintiff's history following accident). Extension of the
ban on ex parte contacts in nonphysician settings would entail an independent analysis
beyond the scope of this Article.
128. McVisk, supra note 6, at 830.
129. Indeed, in Karsten, plaintiff's physician, Dr. Menet, was an employee of defendant and involved in the event giving rise to the lawsuit.
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802(2)(1987) provides that the privilege does
not apply in malpractice cases against the physician. The patient-litigant exception is set
forth in paragraph 8-802(4). On the distinction between the two exceptions, see Turkington, supra note 12, at 308-09; cf Developments, supra note 10, at 1537 (situations
analogous, since plaintiff places physical condition at issue in each).
131. McVisk, supra note 6, at 831.
132. Id.
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to prevent just such a loss. More importantly, until suit is filed,
there is no patient consent to disclosure. Consent, the Petrillo
court emphasized, is an essential element of the medical profession's ethical code upon which the public relies.1 33 The limitation
on the medical privilege, under either the malpractice exception or
the patient-litigant exception, rests on the patient's implied consent
by virtue of the affirmative act of filing a lawsuit.1 34 Regardless of
how strong or well-founded the physician's fear of an impending
lawsuit may be, 135 the decision to relinquish
the protection of the
136
patient privilege is not the physician's.
The second proposed limitation, an "employees-of-defendant"
exception, presents a far greater threat to the rights of injury victims. The typical application would arise in suits against institutional defendants, such as hospitals or clinics, when the treating
physician is not a defendant. 37 The author, in proposing this limitation, asserts that a plaintiff in that circumstance has no legitimate
expectation that his or her physician will preserve the fiduciary relationship to the patient. Mr. McVisk states that "[iun seeking or
accepting treatment from a physician employed by a hospital, the
patient can be expected to recognize that the physician has a fiduciary relationship with his employer and that the employer has the
right to control its employee's work."13' 8 This dubious proposition139 misconstrues the essential premise of Petrillo. It is not the
133. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 589, 499 N.E.2d at 957-58.
134. Id. ("Of key importance is the legislature's determination that it be the patient
who, by affirmative conduct (the filing of a lawsuit) consents to the disclosure of his
previously confidential information."). See also supra note 58.
135. "In the climate of paranoia which prevails today, many physicians picture the
malpractice suit as a 'boogeyman' lurking under every bed and behind every door.
Therefore the disclosure of a patient's confidential records to a doctor's medical insurer
should not be permitted solely because the doctor believes that the patient might commence a malpractice suit." Rea v. Pardo, 133 Misc. 2d 516, 518, 507 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362,
rev'd, 132 A.D.2d 442, 522 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1986).
136. The impact of ex parte contacts on plaintiff's fair trial rights in this circumstance, however, generally will be minimal. If plaintiff ultimately files suit against the
doctor, the anticipatory discussions are unlikely to have seriously prejudiced plaintiff. If
no suit is filed, the attorney's ethical duties prohibit further disclosure. See McVisk,
supra note 6, at 831. If, however, plaintiff brings an action against another physician
involved in the same course of treatment who, as frequently happens, is represented by
the same attorney, that attorney may have the improper advantage of confidential information concerning the patient.
137. In Karsten, Dr. Menet was an employee and shareholder in the defendant clinic.
See also Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 429 N.W.2d 891 (1988) (plaintiff's
treating physicians were staff doctors at defendant hospital), appeal denied, 432 Mich.
912 (1989).
138. McVisk, supra note 6, at 835.
139. Most employees would be astonished to learn that they owe their employer the
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public's expectation of confidentiality that gives rise to the public
policy interest, but rather the medical profession's own code of ethics that "affirmatively advertise[s] to the public that a patient can
properly expect his physician to protect those medical confidences
which are disclosed during the physician-patient relationship."'"
The ethical obligations identified by the court are not conditioned
on the nature of the physician's practice.
The court that decided Petrillo has declined to limit its application. In Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke's Medical Center, 4 '
counsel for defendant hospital conducted ex parte conferences with
plaintiff's physicians, who were staff doctors at the hospital. Appealing a judgment of contempt and exclusion of the physician's
testimony at trial, the defense argued that the rule impeded patient
care by halting the "dialogue" between a hospital and its medical
staff. The court pointed out that the "dialogue" at issue was not
communication among the medical staff for the purpose of providing care, but rather it was communication to the hospital's lawyers
for purposes of defending a lawsuit. 4 2 The court also refused to
elevate the interest in communications among hospital staff above
the interest in protecting confidential communications between patients and their physicians, noting that "agency
principles cannot
43
abrogate the physician-patient privilege."'1
The policy reasons advanced in favor of ex parte conferences
carry even less weight when the physician is the defendant's employee. Any information that the physician may legitimately impart, as discussed above, can be obtained through authorized
discovery. 144 The expense, investment of time, and scheduling difficulties attributed to deposing the plaintiff's doctor are far less onerous when the physician is the defendant's employee. On the
other hand, the potential for improper influence is magnified. Not
only is the physician's economic self-interest naturally aligned with
that of the defendant-employer, but, as Mr. McVisk recognizes, the
physician and the hospital usually will be covered by the same inhigh degree of loyalty and care demanded of a fiduciary. Neither does McVisk cite support for the notion that patients expect less of a hospital-employed physician than of a
self-employed doctor.
140. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 499 N.E.2d at 957.
141. 177 111. App. 3d 313, 532 N.E.2d 327 (1st Dist. 1988).
142. Id. at 317, 532 N.E.2d at 329.
143. Id. In dicta, the Ritter court indicated that where the hospital's liability was
premised solely on vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of the plaintiff's physician
it may be necessary to lift the ban on ex parte consultations to allow the hospital to
defend itself. Id. at 318, 532 N.E.2d at 329-30.
144. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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surer and represented by the same attorney.'4 5
The third proposed limitation, that "physicians or medical care
personnel who are involved in the conduct leading up to or immediately following an injury occurring in a hospital or as the result
of medical care should not be subject to the Petrillo rule[,]"'" is
particularly ill-conceived. To the extent that this category largely
overlaps with the proposed exceptions for potential defendants and
employees of defendants, it is objectionable for the reasons discussed above. 147 Mr. McVisk argues further, however, that once a
malpractice suit is filed, all participants in the medical care should
be entitled to join in defending the action.'4 8 This "right" of a physician to subordinate the fiduciary duty to the patient to the desire
to aid of a hospital or fellow professional is utterly without support. I" The proposal also overlooks the fairly obvious fact that the
legal interests of other participants in the care of plaintiff are likely
to be adverse to defendant's. The defense may well allege that the
conduct of the treating physician was a preexisting, intervening, or
5
contributing cause of the alleged injury. 0
B.

Enforcement of the Rule: How Big a Stick?

Rights are empty without a means to enforce them. One line of
reasoning holds that improper discussions between plaintiff's doctor and defense attorneys are a matter for medical ethics and disciplinary bodies.' 5 ' A related approach is to require the patientplaintiff to pursue a separate action against the physician or de145. McVisk, supra note 6, at 833; see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
146. McVisk, supra note 6, at 836.
147. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
148. McVisk, supra note 6, at 837.
149. The author cites various cases holding that communications between actual or
prospective codefendants and their attorneys concerning matters of mutual interest remain protected by the attorney-client privilege. McVisk, supra note 6, at 837 n.74. Ex
parte conferences do not involve defense communications, but rather the privileged communications between the plaintiff and his or her physician. The nexus between the authorities cited and the proposition is, at best, obscure.
150. See Alston v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C.
1985) ("Treating or consulting physicians who have dealt with a patient after his alleged
injury or trauma may be potential third-party defendants for indemnity or contribution if
that doctor's treatment has exacerbated the patient's condition or may have been an intervening or superseding cause for his present complaints.").
151. See Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984) ("The focal point of
petitioner's distress seems to be Dr. Magnacca's failure to fulfill his fiduciary duty toward
his patient ....Whether he has violated the ethical standards of his profession is a matter
to be addressed by the profession itself. Such standards have not been codified and we
therefore have no jurisdiction on this matter.").
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fense counsel for unauthorized disclosure. 15 2
This approach evinces far too little regard for the practical difficulties of discovering breaches of confidence. 153 More importantly,
it overlooks the prejudice that can infect a trial as a result of ex
parte conferences. If indeed strong public policy demands the
preservation of the confidential and fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship, it would make little sense to permit the
defense to enjoy the benefits of violation of that policy. Apart from
any other remedy, it seems clear that the Karsten problem requires
that the plaintiff's doctors who have engaged in clandestine conferences with defense counsel should, on motion of the plaintiff, be
barred from testifying in the action. The Karsten court properly
concluded:
While Petrillodid not expressly state that the fruits of such unauthorized interviews should be barred from being introduced, allowing such testimony to stand would render the Petrillo holding
hollow and meaningless. We therefore further hold that barring
the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician is an appropriate
sanction to protect the physician-patient privilege from defense
interviews outside formal discovery. While an order barring the
testimony or evidence resulting from such unauthorized conferences would not remedy the breach of trust addressed by Petrillo,
it would nevertheless be an appropriate sanction to protect the
patient's confidences and to preclude such conferences from154
taking place, which was in fact the goal sought by that court.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROTECTION OF
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

Recognition of the strong public policy basis for the prohibition
against ex parte contacts leads ineluctably to the question of
152. See Schwartz v. Goldstein, 400 Mass. 152, 508 N.E.2d 97 (1987) (finding that
exclusion of testimony is too severe a remedy, suggesting instead a separate action against
the physician for breach of confidentiality); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150,
549 A.2d 950 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 671, 558 P.2d 532 (1989) (similar). But see
Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 585, 596 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1987), (expressing
concern "whether the Schwartz approach adequately protects the plaintiff/patient and his
treating physician and whether it encourages unnecessary litigation").
153. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (difficulties discussed).
154. Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 509 N.E.2d 1376, 1384 (2d Dist.),
appeal denied, 117 Ill.2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1086 (1987); see also, Manion, 676 F. Supp. at
596 (exclusion of testimony by treating physicians only effective remedy for damage resulting from exparte contacts); Yates v. El-Deiry 160 Ill. App. 3d 198, 203, 513 N.E.2d
519, 523 (3d Dist. 1987) ("Prejudice and improper conduct can be implied from the fact
that the plaintiff's treating physician has violated his ethical and fiduciary obligations
owed to his patient by engaging in ex parte conferences concerning the patient with the
patient's legal adversary, and without the patient's consent.").
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whether there are constitutional underpinnings to the rule. No
court yet has held that ex parte conferences between the plaintiff's
doctor and defense counsel are unconstitutional, though several
have hinted that the right to privacy may be implicated.' " Constitutional principle being more protective than public policy," 6
plaintiffs' attorneys likely will advance constitutional arguments in
support of the rights of patients.
The right to privacy clearly is recognized as grounded in the
constitution. 157 The United States Supreme Court has explained
that this right protects two distinct interests: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 158 Both facets of privacy are implicated in compelled disclosure of medical information. In a case involving
disclosure of medical records, one court has stated that
"[i]nformation about one's body and state of health is matter
which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may lead a private life.' . . . Therefore, we
hold that it falls within one of the zones of privacy entitled to
protection. '
Medical decisions are sufficiently important to personal auton155. Disclosure of confidences made by a patient to a physician, or even of medical data concerning the individual patient could, under certain circumstances,
pose such a serious threat to a patient's right not to have personal matters revealed that it would be impermissible under either the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Moses, 379 Pa. Super 150, 549 A.2d at 954 (quoting In re June 1979 Allegheny County
Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 149-53, 415 A.2d 73, 77-78 (1980)). The Petrillo
court itself identified the state constitution as a source of public policy. Petrillo, 148 Ill.
App. 3d at 587, 499 N.E.2d at 956; see also Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 536
N.E.2d 1126, 1131, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707, 712 (1989) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
598-99, for the proposition that "government disclosure of private medical information
implicates constitutional right to privacy.").
156. See Turkington, supra note 12, at 270-71 & n.16.
157. "[A] right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of personal privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973). That right is deemed "fundamental." Id. at 154; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
158. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). "Informational" privacy - an
interest in keeping personal matters out of public view - and "substantive" privacy an interest in making decisions about private matters free from government interference
- both spring from Justice Brandeis' concept of a "right to be let alone" in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Protection of these two
interests has developed along parallel, but distinct lines. See Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 745 n.47 (1989). Both interests, however, may be
viewed as aspects of "personal autonomy" essential to a free society. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-37 (1973).
159. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
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omy to support a substantive privacy right to noninterference in
the physician-patient relationship. In Doe v. Bolton, Justice Douglas stated:
The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place than in the
physician-patient relationship .... The right to seek advice on

one's health and the right to place reliance on the physician
6 ° of
one's choice are basic to Fourteenth Amendment values.1
Roe v. Wade and subsequent abortion decisions frequently have
identified, in addition to a woman's own right to privacy, a right to
medical consultation unfettered by government restraint.' 61 Relying upon this line of authority, the American Medical Association
recently argued to the Court that "[i]ndividuals have a fundamental right to make decisions about their medical care, and state laws
are narwhich interfere with that right can be justified only if they
1 62
rowly tailored to further a compelling state interest."'
A guarantee of privacy in the physician-privilege relationship
also may rest on independent state constitutional grounds. State
constitutions may, of course, afford greater protection of individual
rights than that demanded by the federal constitution. 163 Ten
Those resisting collection or release of patient information generally have relied on the
informational right of privacy. Turkington, supra note 12, at 269.
160. 410 U.S. 179, 219-20 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
161.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (Court stated that its decision on constitutional right of

privacy "vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according
to his professional judgment"). Compare Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (upholding an informed consent provision that enhanced the physician-patient relationship) with Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445
(1983) (striking down a requirement that physicians give an anti-abortion message as
intruding "upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician") and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763, (1986) (striking
down a similar requirement because "it officially structures - as it obviously was intended to do - the dialogue between the woman and her physician"). See also Whalen,
429 U.S. at 603 (requirement that doctors report prescriptions of certain substances upheld since "the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the
patient.")
162. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association, et al. at 25, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). This contention was advanced even
more forcefully in Brief of Amici Curiae Bioethicists For Privacy at 4, Webster. The
plurality in Webster, however, declined to engage in a " 'great issues' debate" concerning
the constitutional right to privacy, 109 S.Ct. at 3057, over the strenuous disapproval of
Roe's author, Justice Blackmun. 109 S. Ct. at 3072 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); MOSK, THE STATE COURTS IN AMERICAN LAW: THE
THIRD CENTURY 216 (1976); Note, State Constitutional GuaranteesAs Adequate State
Ground: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737
(1976).
Justice Linde, of the Oregon Supreme Court points out that it is now recognized that
state courts have a responsibility to assess statutes against their own state constitutions
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states have incorporated an express guarantee of the right to privacy in their state constitutions. 1 " A number of others have found
the right implicit in their state charters. 165 Indeed, state courts
have conferred constitutional privacy protection more liberally and
in more varied circumstances than has the United States Supreme
Court.' 6 6 Several state courts, for example, have held that court-

ordered discovery of psychotherapist-patient information may violate the state constitutional right to privacy. 167 The identities of
blood donors has68been held to be undiscoverable under the state
right to privacy.'
A recognition that the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship is safeguarded, not only as a matter of public policy but
also by the right to privacy, would sound the death knell for the
practice of ex parte contacts. Infringement of the right to privacy
169
implicates the liberty component of the due process clause.
Though ex parte discussions are referred to as "informal discovery," the practice places the court in the position of compelling the
before considering constitutionality under federal law. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). From 1970 to 1985,
according to one study, over 250 decisions were issued by state courts that afforded citizens greater rights under state constitutions than required by the minimum requirements
of the U.S. Constitution. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1985).
164. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAWAII CONST. art I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
These vary widely in formulation. The Montana guarantee provides: "The right of indi-

vidual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Illinois' provision states: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation." ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
165. See Hubener, Rights of Privacy in Open Courts: Do They Exist?, 2 EMERGING
ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189, 196 (1989); Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977).
166. See Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1431-35 (1982) (cases invoking state constitutional
rights of privacy have addressed situations that have not been presented to federal courts
and have expanded privacy rights beyond those recognized under the U.S. Constitution).
167. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3rd 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557 (1970); In re
"B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978). See Smith, Medical and PsychotherapyPrivileges
and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 Ky.
L.J. 473, 499-502 (1986-87); Turkington, supra note 12, at 355-59.
168. See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987); see
also Turkington, Confidentiality Policy For HIV-Related Information: An Analytical
Framework For Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 900-02 (1989).
169. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23 (1977). The due process clause applies
in civil suits, for the benefit of both parties. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982).
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patient to consent. 170 This is sufficient state action to implicate the
right to privacy. 17 1 The right to privacy is, of course, not absolute.
It is a fundamental right, however, so that any infringement must
172
be shown to be necessary to further a compelling state interest.
173
Infringement on fundamental rights warrants strict scrutiny.
Fundamental rights also include state constitutional rights express
or implied.' 74 For purposes of triggering strict scrutiny, it is not
essential to prove a direct violation of the constitutional right to
privacy.
[T]he Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our
prior cases involved legislation which "deprived, .... infringed," or
"interfered" with the free
exercise of some such fundamental per1 75
sonal right or liberty.
Under the first prong of the constitutional analysis, a rule permitting ex parte conferences can be sustained only where the state
establishes that the practice is necessary to further a compelling
state interest. 176 Even assuming for the purpose of argument that
ex parte interviews save defendants time and money and afford
greater protection to work product, it strains credulity to deem
these goals to be compelling state interests. Moreover, the ex parte
contacts fail the second prong of strict scrutiny: There are other
less intrusive methods reasonably available. One commentator has
followed the constitutional analysis to this conclusion:
Ex parte contacts violate the patient's due process rights because
the patient's interest in maintaining the privacy of her relationship with her physician far outweighs any conceivable state interest in private consultations. 77 Permitting the physician to testify
170. See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983) (issuing order to
plaintiff to execute the appropriate authorization forms evidencing consent to ex parte
discussions); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (same).
171. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (first amendment applicable
to discovery in civil action).
172. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. "Fundamental rights," for purposes of strict scrutiny, include those that are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
174. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (abrogation of
discovery rule violative of equal protection under strict scrutiny triggered by infringement of state constitutional guarantee against limitation of recovery).
175. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-38 (emphasis added).
176. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451-54 (2d ed.
1988); Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
177. Ward, supra note 99, at 64.
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adversely to the patient is error of constitutional magnitude, requiring reversal of an adverse judgment unless the defendant can
demonstrate that it was harmless.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Secret meetings between defense lawyers and treating physicians
are an affront to both the rights of patients, who are entitled to
place their trust in their doctors, and the rights of plaintiffs to a fair
trial of their claims against alleged wrongdoers. Sensitivity to
these rights undoubtedly will lead other courts to condemn the
practice, based on the patient privilege, the broader dictates of public policy, or even constitutional privacy considerations. Courts
also will be faced with the logic of the Karsten court that enforcement of the rule requires reversal of judgments affected by its
violation.
The rights of Americans are secured by an adversarial system of
justice. The most corrosive abuses tend to be those that undermine
the adversarial system itself. The philosopher John Rawls proposed the theory that the fundamental fairness of a society is best
judged by its treatment of the least advantaged. 178 Basic fairness in
the manner in which the justice system treats injured victims demands that the practice of ex parte contacts be outlawed.

178.
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(1971).

